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What Does Intellectual Freedom 
Mean Today?  
 
David Khan
For the subjectivity speaking the continual becoming of self and other within 
the hegemonic frame of contemporary, Western discourse, intellectual freedom 
today will find itself in the vanquishing and relinquishing of certain cherished 
myths. According to these fantasies, intellectual freedom has been conceived 
in terms of an antagonism between the one and the other — which is to say, in 
terms of the struggle for self-determination waged by the individual (defined 
as unique, authentic, original, self-willing) against the vanishing of the self into 
the collective (understood as the expression of commonality, compromise, 
derivation, pre-determination). Being intellectually free has tended to be 
construed in terms of the apotheosis or complete self-realisation of the one 
in spite of or against the others. The impossibility, for the one, of attaining the 
ideal state of being intellectually free exemplifies the subjective predicament. 
In the arena of subjectivity conceived in terms of the animus of the one 
against the others, finitude, lack, incapacity, destitution have been the defining 
characteristics of the one who would aspire to be intellectually free and, 
inevitably, to fail in that endeavour. In this scheme, genuine intellectual freedom 
is, effectively, proscribed for the “ordinary” person. Instead, one pantomimes 
(or, more precisely, is pantomimed by) a grotesque counterfeit freedom that 
seems socially and culturally imposed and, moreover, exceeding and eluding the 
rational ethos of the Kantian categorical imperative, insists with the paradoxical 
injunction to maximally invest in and celebrate it.1  Even the genius — the 
supposed exception that proves the rule or Law by which the Other is imagined 
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to perform the ordinary one — is not immune to this excessive demand. Genius 
must pay its dues. Invariably, the intellectual freedom of the “exceptional” one 
carries a fearful price: isolation, insanity, persecution, pariah-hood. No wonder, 
then, that the idea of intellectual freedom has gathered around itself an aura 
of heroism — albeit, a heroism whose victories may seem pyrrhic and whose 
triumphs often are leavened with tragedy. In light of this state of affairs, let 
us propose to seek the meaning of intellectual freedom today beyond the 
antagonism of the one against the others. So that, even if this meaning takes the 
form of an ideal, imperative, or challenge that impresses with ethical necessity, 
it will be given neither by the one nor the others, nor by the one against the 
others, nor by the Other performing the one but rather by the one and the 
others, the one with the others. 
 But what does it mean, today, to suggest that the meaning of intellectual 
freedom is given by the one with the others? In the first place, we do not 
mean, simply, the one working constructively with the others or the others 
making a place for the one. On the contrary, we have in mind a conception of 
subjectivity that testifies to the vanishing of absolute distinctions between the 
one and the other, or between the one and the other ones. That is to say, we 
posit a subjectivity resisting the tendency of Western metaphysics to privilege 
the interior self-presence of the one; otherness being defined in terms of that 
which is exterior to and absent from the one. We propose that such a model 
of subjectivity gives the meaning of intellectual freedom today insofar as it 
draws on now-decades-old discursive currents that, whilst already pivotal to 
many of the far-reaching transformations in thinking and being we associate 
with the postmodern, continue to urgently insist in the present. And here, to 
put our cards squarely on the table, we have in mind a thinking of the one with 
the others responsive to Heidegger’s destruktion of Western metaphysics as 
ontotheology and his challenge to think the un-thought (indeed, unthinkable) 
ontological difference as the becoming of difference constitutive of Being 
and beings.2 We have in mind, also, the reverberations of these Heideggerian 
gestures in Lacanian and Derridean thought, where the Heideggerian injunction 
to think the becoming of difference might be expressed, respectively, in 
terms of an admonition to be in and as traversing fantasy or to be in and as 
deconstruction.3  What is common to these different ways of thinking the one 
with the others is that they challenge us to understand that the “essence” of the 
subjectivity proper to thinking the one with the others escapes the metaphysical 
fixation on that which either is inside or outside the one. In the language 
employed by the aforementioned three thinkers, this subjectivity defines an “ek-
sisting” “being-in-the-world” (Heidegger’s Dasein), an “intimate exteriority” or 
“extimacy” (the “real” dimension of Lacan’s desiring subjectivity, inculcating the 
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pure difference between ego and Other, conscious and unconscious, signified 
and signifier), or the logic of the supplement (Derrida’s understanding that, 
in the field of subjectivity, always already, conceptions of essential interiority 
legislate neither entirely nor sufficiently but, on the contrary, define an original 
lack demanding continual supplementation by a contextual exteriority).4
 More simply, perhaps, these different ways of thinking the one with the 
others challenge us to understand that, always already, the other is “in” the one 
and the one is “in” the other; the one is only insofar as it is being continuously 
inhabited and remade by the other and, conversely, the other is only insofar 
as it is being continuously inhabited and remade by the one. Here, neither 
the one nor the others are “fundamental”. On the contrary, priority is to be 
accorded to “that” which enables the process of “inhabiting” or “remaking” 
by virtue of which the one and the others are continually precipitated in the 
form of a reciprocating simultaneity — namely, a function of pure difference or 
differencing. Still further, we could say that the subjectivity proper to thinking 
the one with the others (which is to say, the subjectivity giving the meaning 
of intellectual freedom today) defines a reciprocating simultaneity of inside/
outside, one/other, identity/difference — where, the /, virgule, or retronym 
underscores the nature of this subjectivity as a difference-within-unity and/
or a unity-that-is-differentiated, a one that is in itself only insofar as it is 
becoming different from itself; in short: the continual becoming of an identity-in-
difference.5  The magnitude of the challenge before us is evident in that, for the 
self-conscious one, full cognizance of this simultaneous reciprocity is impossible. 
The constitutive becoming of difference, by virtue of which the one and the 
others continually crystallise, precisely is where the self-conscious one isn’t and 
where it can’t be. In and of itself, the self-conscious one cannot coincide with 
its constitutive ground — which is to say, cannot be at one with what Heidegger 
refers to as the “event of appropriation” (Ereignis), Lacan the “instance” 
or “agency” of the letter, and Derrida the “arche-trace” and “movement of 
différance”.6  Thus, the challenge posed by the subjectivity giving the meaning 
of intellectual freedom today is, quite literally, Sisyphean. To employ Žižekian 
metaphors, it is akin to being as a ray of light seeking the limit of the curvature 
of the space-time that is, in fact, the very “agent” of its refraction. This state of 
affairs engenders a “parallax view” such that, always already, objective reality 
bears a subjective “stain” (or self-projection) that, simultaneously, is reflecting 
back (or being introjected) into the subject as an aporia or lacuna exceeding 
the subject’s grasp. As Žižek points out, this enigma corresponds to the 
Lacanian objet petit a: the unrecoverable, irresolvable, excessive, and elusive 
“object-cause” of desire that, in Seminar XI, Lacan equates with the “gaze”—an 
intersubjective field potential, the continuous breakdown of which precipitates 
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the ever-troubled subject-object dichotomy.7  
 Nevertheless, the impossibility of being in and as the subjectivity giving 
the meaning of intellectual freedom today does not excuse retreating into 
the twin nihilisms of relativism (confronting impossibility confirms subjective 
incapacity to speak truth) or idealism (confronting impossibility confirms 
subjective incapacity to know material reality — “material” tending to be 
conceived, metaphysically, as substance rather than as difference) insofar as 
these are, merely, fantasies indulged by the conscious one in the face of the 
“real” subjectivity that is as the continual becoming of the identity-in-difference 
one/other. What is crucial to bear in mind is that this subjectivity, as the thinking 
of the one with the others, is not and, indeed, never can be an accomplishment 
of either the one or the other. The gesture towards being in and as the 
subjectivity giving the meaning of intellectual freedom today does not require 
a complete abnegation of either the one or the other, nor would such an 
abnegation even be possible given that the one and the other are effects or 
precipitations of something “prior”: namely the function of pure difference or 
differencing by which the identity-in-difference one/other continually becomes. 
The critical point is that, always already, one gestures towards this potentially 
liberating mode of subjectivity only insofar as, always already, one is as being 
given to make this gesture. For the conscious one, the meaning of intellectual 
freedom today resides in this realisation that the one forever will be striving to 
coincide with its constitutive ground and that this way of being obtains because 
one has no choice: because one is as forever being given to so strive. The 
misrecognition underpinning the antagonism of the one against the others is to 
imagine that the gesture is given by the others or, indeed, the Other, as opposed 
to the “real” becoming of the identity-in-difference one/other: the one with the 
others.
1 The characterisation of this “counterfeit freedom” as a semblance of social 
and cultural programming reflects the Lacanian/Žižekian understanding that, 
simply and immediately, to regard the one as dancing to the tune of the Other 
misrecognises the “obscene” demand of the “real” superego to “Enjoy!” In 
Lacanian theory, this demand is synonymous with the impossible jouissance 
theorised as constitutive of, yet also exceeding and eluding, the endlessly 
insisting imaginary/symbolic dialectic of desiring subjectivity — as expressed 
in the perpetual tension between the ideal ego (how I fantasise or prefer to 
see myself) and the Ego-Ideal (how I am told I should be by the big Other of 
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language-mediated culture and society). See, for example, Lacan SXX, 3, where 
it is stated: “The superego is the imperative of jouissance — Enjoy!” See, also, 
Žižek 1989, 81, where it is observed that a “commonplace of Lacanian theory” 
highlights the manner by which the “Kantian moral imperative conceals an 
obscene superego injunction: Enjoy! — the voice of the Other impelling us to 
follow our duty is a traumatic irruption of an appeal to impossible jouissance”.
2 The necessity for a “destruction” of Western metaphysics is outlined in 
Heidegger 2010, 21-23. The challenge to think the unthought ontological 
difference and the characterisation of Western metaphysics as ontotheology 
can be found, for example, in Heidegger 1969b. Here, Heidegger remarks on 
the necessity to “speak the difference between Being and beings” in terms 
of a “step back... from what is unthought, from the difference as such, into 
what gives us thought” — namely, “the oblivion of the difference” (50). Still 
further, the “difference of Being and beings” is defined as the “differentiation” 
or “perdurance” of “overwhelming” and “arrival” in “unconcealing keeping in 
concealment” (65), where “overwhelming” refers to the enigmatic dimension of 
Being that “arrives as something of itself unconcealed only by that coming-over” 
into beings and “arrival” to the way beings “appear in the manner of the arrival 
that keeps itself concealed in unconcealedness” (64-65). Finally, Heidegger 
maintains that Western metaphysics is ontotheology insofar as it perpetuates 
(i) the “onto-logic” presumption that there is an irreducible element common 
to or grounding all beings and (ii) the “theo-logic” presumption that there is a 
“highest being” serving as absolute, transcendental origin and end of beings 
(70-71).
3 Referring to a mode of being in and as traversing fantasy or being in and as 
deconstruction carries a twofold resonance. In the first place, the subjectivity 
in analysis or deconstruction is in the nature of a becoming — a subjectivity 
that is as continually becoming different from itself. Secondly, the corollary 
of this endlessly becoming subjectivity is the interminability of analysis 
or deconstruction—wherein the “end” of subjective self-realization, or the 
determination of truth and meaning, is more in the nature of an aim or ideal than 
a terminus or final destination. Thus, in Lacan SVI, Seminar 21, 20 May 1959, 264, 
it is asserted that the “I” that must speak in the place of “unconscious desire” 
as “the goal, the end, the term of analysis” is “the subject of a becoming”. The 
characterisation of the end of analysis as traversing fantasy first appears in 
Lacan SXI, 273-74, where Lacan refers to it as the “beyond of analysis” that 
“has never been approached” or has “been approachable only at the level of 
the analyst” in the so-called “training analysis... a psycho-analysis that has... 
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specifically traversed the cycle of the analytic experience in its totality... looped 
this loop to its end”, where “The loop must be run through several times.” 
Analogously, in Derrida 1988, 4, it is suggested that
Deconstruction takes place, it is an event that does not await 
the deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject... It 
deconstructs it-self. It can be deconstructed. [Ça se déconstruit.] The 
“it” [ça] is not here an impersonal thing that is opposed to some
egological subjectivity. It is in deconstruction (the Littré says, “to 
deconstruct it-self [se déconstruire]... to lose its construction”). And 
the “se” of “se déconstruire,” which is not
the reflexivity of an ego or a consciousness, bears the whole enigma.
4 For references to the Heideggerian conception of subjectivity as “ek-sistent” 
“being in the world” see, for example, Heidegger 1998, 247, where “the ek-
sistence of human beings” is defined as “standing in the clearing of being”, 
and Heidegger 2010, 129, where it is suggested that Dasein “is cleared in itself 
as being-in-the-world, not by another being, but in such a way that it is itself 
the clearing”. For a reference to the Lacanian conception of subjectivity as 
“intimate exteriority” or “extimacy” see, for example, Lacan SVII, 139, where 
these terms are used to characterise the nature of the “central place… that is the 
Thing” — namely, the “real” basis of subjectivity. For references to the Derridean 
conception of subjectivity in terms of the “logic of the supplement” see, for 
example, Derrida 1997, 145, and Derrida 1973, 88.
5 Here, we are appropriating and slightly modifying the term “identity in 
difference” as it is employed in Lacan SI, 243.
6 With regard to Ereignis, in Heidegger 1969a, the event of appropriation is 
described as “an owning in which man and Being are delivered over to each 
other” (36) and as “that realm, vibrating within itself, through which man and 
Being reach each other in their nature, achieve their active nature by losing 
those qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them” (37). The “agency” 
of the “letter” is addressed in Lacan 2006, wherein the letter is defined, 
somewhat obliquely, as “the essentially localized structure of the signifier” (418) 
(i.e., what Derrida might term a “trace structure”). A clearer sense of the letter is 
conveyed in Lacan SIX. Here, for example, Lacan asserts that
It is qua pure difference that the [linguistic] unit, in its signifying 
function, structures itself, constitutes itself... nothing in the function is 
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properly speaking thinkable, unless it starts from the following which I 
formulate as: the one as such is the Other. It is starting from here, from 
this fundamental structure of the one as difference that we can see 
appearing this origin from which one can see the signifier constituting 
itself... (Seminar 3, 29 November 1961, 27)
 
Lacan subsequently defines the letter as the “essence of the signifier through 
which it is distinguished from the sign” (Seminar 4, 6 December 1961, 32) , 
which “in its simplest form... is... the einziger Zug [single train or single trait]” or 
“unary trait” (ibid, 33). With regard to the arche-trace and différance, in Derrida 
1997, there is reference to the “originary trace” as “the pure movement which 
produces difference”, and the assertion that “The (pure) trace is differance” 
(62), where, moreover, “Differance is... the formation of form” and “the being-
imprinted of the imprint” (63) (i.e., trace and différance involve a simultaneous 
movement of inscription and effacement: the trace is that which presents as 
absent, appears as disappeared). On this basis, Derrida goes on to suggest that
The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which 
amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense 
in general. The trace is the differance which opens appearance... and 
signification... the trace is not more ideal than real, not more intelligible 
than sensible, not more a transparent signification than an opaque 
energy and no concept of metaphysics can describe it. (65)
7 Žižek invokes the curved space of Einstein’s General Relativity as a metaphor 
for the Lacanian conception of the drive on various occasions. See, for example, 
Žižek 1995, 8-9, and Žižek 2006, 61. See ibid for an introductory definition of 
the ‘parallax view’ and its relationship to the Lacanian objet petit a. Here, Žižek 
defines the ‘parallax view’ in terms of the way
 
...subject and object are inherently “mediated,” so that an 
“epistemological” shift in the subject’s point of view always reflects an 
“ontological” shift in the object itself. Or — to put it in Lacanese — the 
subject’s gaze is always already inscribed into the perceived object 
itself, in the guise of its “blind spot,” that which is “in the object more 
than the object itself”, the point from which the object itself returns the 
gaze. (17)
As Žižek continues, the manner by which, always already, the subjectivised 
object is being introjected (i.e., the manner by which the gaze of the 
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subjectivised object returns the subject-in-the-object back into the subject) 
occurs ‘in the guise of a stain’ or ‘objectivized splinter in... [the subject’s] eye.’ 
In Žižek’s view, the “structure” of this “reflexive short circuit” is implicit in 
objet petit a: “the very cause of the parallax gap, that unfathomable X which 
forever eludes the symbolic grasp, and thus causes the multiplicity of symbolic 
perspectives” (17-18). With regard to the relationship Lacan establishes between 
objet petit a and the ‘gaze’, in Lacan SXI, one finds discussion of the “autonomy” 
of the “function of the stain”, which is “identified with that of the gaze... in 
marking the pre-existence to the seen of a given-to-be-seen” and as “that 
which governs the gaze most secretly and that which always escapes from 
the grasp of that form of vision that is satisfied with itself in imagining itself as 
consciousness” (74). Subsequently, it is suggested that “The gaze may contain 
in itself the objet a of the Lacanian algebra where the subject falls” (76) (i.e., 
where the illusion of self-conscious empowerment and sufficiency evaporates in 
the face of the insistence of unfathomable unconscious desire) and that, in the 
“scopic relation” (i.e., the relation between subject and object),
…the interest the subject takes in his own split is bound up with that 
which determines it — namely, a privileged object, which has emerged 
from some primal separation, from some self-mutilation induced by the 
very approach of the real, whose name, in our algebra, is the objet a. 
(83)
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